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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
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SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
     Appellant filed various claims against his former employer 
alleging racial discrimination and retaliatory harassment and 
discharge as a result of his pursuit of discrimination claims in 
agency proceedings.  He eventually prevailed on the retaliation 
claim, though not on the claim of pre-retaliation discrimination.  
At the conclusion of the proceedings, Appellant petitioned for 
attorneys' fees, and his request was reduced by the district 
court by more than eighty percent.  He now appeals the reduction 
of the fee award. 
 
                 I. Facts and procedural posture 
 
     On June 22, 1992, Martin Washington filed an action in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania against his former employer, the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas (the "County Court" or the "Court").  Mr. 
Washington's nine-count complaint alleged racially discriminatory 
acts with respect to employment under both federal and state 
statutes; retaliatory harassment and discharge after he filed an 
administrative claim of racial discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human 
Rights Commission, under both federal and state statutes; civil 
rights violations under federal and state statutes; violation of 
Pennsylvania's public policy and common law; and breach of 
contract of employment. 
     Five of the nine counts were dismissed on summary judgment 
in June 1993.  The case eventually went to trial in November 
1993.  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found that the 
County Court did not discriminate against Mr. Washington on the 
basis of race.  The jury did find, however, that the Court had 
unlawfully retaliated against Mr. Washington for filing his 
administrative claims, and awarded him compensatory damages of 
$25,000.  After the jury verdict, the district court granted a 
post-trial Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law to the County 
Court setting aside the jury verdict. 
     Mr. Washington appealed to this Court.  We reversed the 
district court's order granting the post-trial motion, and 
reinstated the jury verdict.  Washington v. Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas, 47 F.3d 1163 (3d Cir. 1995) [table].  On 
remand, judgment was entered for Mr. Washington on the verdict. 
     At the conclusion of these proceedings, Mr. Washington's 
lead attorney, Alan B. Epstein, filed a Petition for Attorneys' 
Fees claiming that Mr. Washington was the "prevailing party" and 
seeking a total award of $175,987.50 in attorneys' fees for 
himself and two colleagues at the firm of Jablon, Epstein, Wolf 
and Drucker.  Mr. Washington also sought fees of $3060 for 
Lanier B. Williams, his attorney in the administrative 
proceedings, as well as $7973.87 in plaintiff costs.  Plaintiff's 
Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Costs of 
Litigation, Washington v. Philadelphia County Court of Common 
Pleas, No. 92-CV-3637 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 1995) [hereinafter 
Petition] (JA 12).  The County Court challenged, inter alia, the 
sum requested for Mr. Epstein and his colleagues, asserting that 
both the hourly fees and hours requested were excessive.  
Objections of Defendant, Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 
County to Plaintiff's Petition for Attorneys' Fees and 
Reimbursement for Costs of Litigation, Washington v. Philadelphia 
County Court of Common Pleas, No. 92-CV-3637 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 
1995). 
     On June 30, 1995, the district court entered a memorandum 
and order on the fee request.  Washington v. Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas, No. 92-CV-3637 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1995) 
(mem.) [hereinafter Memorandum].  The court decreased the number 
of hours allowable by one half, finding Mr. Epstein's claim 
"excessive and unreasonable," id., typescript at 8, and by an 
additional fifty percent because Mr. Washington "hardly won a 
decisive victory in this case."  Id.  The court, however, did not 
extend the fifty-percent reduction to hours claimed in 
preparation of the fee petition. 
     Regarding the hourly rates sought by Mr. Epstein and his 
colleagues, the district court deemed it "impossible to consider 
[them] as bona fide hourly rates."  Id., typescript at 11.  
Instead, the court concluded that "a reasonable hourly rate for 
[Alan B.] Epstein is $175 per hour.  A reasonable rate for 
[Thomas D.] Rapp is $100 per hour.  A reasonable rate for [Nancy] 
Abrams is $85 per hour."  Id., typescript at 12. 
     Based on its various assessments, the court calculated the 
amount of the award for Mr. Epstein and his colleagues at 
$30,389.63, roughly seventeen percent of Mr. Epstein's request.  
Id., typescript at 13.  In addition, the court disallowed any fee 
for Mr. Williams, "who unsuccessfully represented Washington at 
his PHRC hearing," id., and awarded $7973.97 for plaintiff 
costs.  Id. 
     Mr. Washington is now appealing the district court's order 
reducing the counsel fees.  He argues that: 
     The district court erred as a matter of law in its 
     reduction of the hourly rate for plaintiff's counsel 
     and in its reduction of the compensable hours 
     reasonably expended by counsel in this litigation.  On 
     both issues the district court applied erroneous legal 
     standards; further, on the compensable hours issue, the 
     court made clearly erroneous factual determinations. 
Brief of Appellant at 12. 
 
                         II. Jurisdiction 
 
     This action was commenced pursuant to the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.  2000e et seq.  The district 
court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C.  2000e-5(f)(3) and 
28 U.S.C.  1331 and 1343.  Plaintiff's various state claims 
were properly before the district court pursuant to the doctrine 
of supplemental jurisdiction as codified at 28 U.S.C.  1367(a). 
     The district court issued a final order on Plaintiff's 
petition for attorneys' fees on June 30, 1995.  We have 
jurisdiction over an appeal from this order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
 1291. 
 
                          III. Analysis 
 
     We review the reasonableness of an award of attorney's fees 
for an abuse of discretion.  Rose v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 
1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990).  The question of what standards to 
apply in calculating an award of attorneys' fees is a legal 
question, and therefore we exercise plenary review over this 
issue.  Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 472 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
     The matter of an attorney's marketplace billing rate is a 
factual question which is subject to a clearly erroneous standard 
of review.  Student Public Interest Research Group v. AT & T Bell 
Laboratories, 842 F.2d 1436, 1442 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Black 
Grievance Committee v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 802 F.2d 648, 
652 (3d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted), vacated on other grounds, 
483 U.S. 1015 (1987)).  More generally, 
     the appellate court may not upset a trial court's 
     exercise of discretion on the basis of a visceral  
     disagreement with the lower court's decision.  
     Similarly, the appellate court may not reverse where 
     the trial court employs correct standards and 
     procedures, and makes findings of fact not clearly 
     erroneous.  In sum, "[i]f the district court had 
     applied the correct criteria to the facts of the case, 
     then, it is fair to say that we will defer to its 
     exercise of discretion." 
Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 
1989) (quoting Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. 
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d 
Cir. 1976) (in banc) (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 
1068 (1990). 
 
                    A. The law of the lodestar 
 
     The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he most useful starting 
point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the 
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied 
by a reasonable hourly rate."  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 
424, 433 (1983); see also Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183 (same).  The 
result of this computation is called the lodestar.  The lodestar 
is strongly presumed to yield a reasonable fee.  City of 
Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992). 
     In this instance, the district court rejected Plaintiff's 
claims with regard to both the billing rates of his attorneys and 
the numbers of hours reasonably expended on the litigation.  We 
review each element in turn. 
                        B. The billing rates 
 
     The general rule is that a reasonable hourly rate is 
calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the 
community.  Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 n.11 (1984); 
Student Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 842 F.2d at 1448 
(adopting the community market rule).  The prevailing party bears 
the burden of establishing by way of satisfactory evidence, "in 
addition to [the] attorney's own affidavits," Blum, 465 U.S. at 
895 n.11, that the requested hourly rates meet this standard. 
     In the instant matter, counsel Alan Epstein sought hourly 
fees of $250 and $275 for himself; fees of $140 and $165 per hour 
for an associate, Thomas D. Rapp; and fees of $140 and $150 per 
hour for another associate, Nancy Abrams.  Petition, typescript 
at 10.  In support of the request, the lawyers submitted numerous 
documents, including a "Verification" (in effect, an affidavit) 
from Mr. Epstein for the fees cited, affidavits from various 
Philadelphia lawyers practicing in employment discrimination 
cases suggesting fees comparable to Mr. Epstein's, and billing 
statements in the case. 
     As the district court accurately noted, "[t]he issue of 
determining the reasonable hourly rate for an attorney, and the 
specific issue of determining a reasonable rate for Epstein and 
his associates are not unchartered waters in the district," 
Memorandum, typescript at 9.  On two earlier occasions, the 
district court had considered similar requests from Mr. Epstein.  
Griffiths v. Cigna Corp., No. CIV. A. 91-2356 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 
1994) (VanArtsdalen, J.) (Memorandum and Order); Oliver v. Bell 
Atlantic Corp., No. CIV. A. 92-751 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1994) 
(Robreno, J.) (Order Memorandum).  In both cases, the court 
rejected Mr. Epstein's claim and lowered his fee from the 
requested $250 an hour to a "reasonable hourly rate" of $175 per 
hour.  Griffiths, 1994 WL 543501, *2; Oliver, 1994 WL 315815, 
**4-5.  It is worth noting that the court's determination in 
Oliver was based on Judge VanArtsdalen's analysis in Griffiths. 
     The court in the instant case rejected Mr. Epstein's request 
as well and concluded: 
     I will follow the rulings made by Judge VanArtsdalen in 
     Griffith [sic] and Judge Robreno in Oliver.  I find 
     that a reasonable rate for Epstein is $175 per hour.  A 
     reasonable rate for Rapp is $100 per hour.  A 
     reasonable rate for Abrams is $85 per hour. 
Memorandum, typescript at 2. 
     Those rulings, however, are no longer valid.  This Court 
recently vacated the district court's decision in Griffiths on 
the very issue of hourly rates.  Griffiths v. Cigna Corp., Nos. 
94-2090 & 94-2091 (3d Cir. Nov. 30, 1995) (unpublished).  In 
rejecting the district court's determination, we explained: 
          As the prevailing party, Griffiths had the burden 
     of demonstrating "the community billing rate charged by 
     attorneys of equivalent skill and experience performing 
     work of similar complexity."  See PIRG, 842 F.2d at 
     1450.  We find that he did sustain that burden as to 
     Mr. Epstein's requested rate of $250 per hour, by 
     submitting the affidavits of Harold Goodman, Alica 
     Ballard, and Lorrie McKinley, attorneys in the 
     Philadelphia area who represent plaintiffs in civil 
     rights litigation. These affidavits stated that Mr. 
     Epstein's requested hourly rate of $250 was reasonable 
     and within the range of prevailing rates charged by 
     Philadelphia attorneys with Mr. Epstein's skill and 
     experience.  The opposition submitted by CIGNA failed 
     to rebut plaintiff's submissions on this point, both 
     because CIGNA's affidavits focused on the market rates 
     of defense attorneys, and because CIGNA did not 
     otherwise effectively challenge the content of 
     plaintiff's affidavits. 
 
          Where, as here, the plaintiff has met his prima 
     facie burden under the "community market rate" lodestar 
     test, and the opposing party has not produced 
     contradictory evidence, the district court may not 
     exercise its discretion to adjust the requested rate 
     downward.  Accordingly, we will vacate the attorneys' 
     fee award with respect to the hourly rate allowed for 
     Mr. Epstein's services, and direct that his services be 
     compensated at the $250 rate that plaintiff's 
     uncontroverted proofs established. 
 
          By contrast, plaintiff did not meet his prima 
     facie burden of proof with respect to the rates of 
     plaintiff's other attorneys, Mr. Rapp and Ms. Adams.  
     Specifically, Griffiths failed to demonstrate that the 
     requested rates were the prevailing rates in the 
     community.  In the absence of such a showing, the 
     district court must exercise its discretion in fixing a 
     reasonable hourly rate.  This court cannot say that 
     $100 and $85 per hour are unreasonable, and accordingly 
     the district court's award based on these rates will be 
     affirmed. 
Id., typescript at 14-16. 
     Our reasoning in Griffiths applies with equal strength in 
the instant matter.  (It is worth noting that the same attorneys 
filed affidavits in support of Mr. Epstein's claim, and the 
district court even noted that Ms. Ballard "apparently filed an 
identical affidavit before Judge VanArtsdalen in the Griffith[sic] 
case.").  See also Black Grievance Committee, 802 F.2d at 
652-53 (district court is not free to disregard attorney's 
affidavit when the other party "filed no affidavit and offered no 
testimony contesting the accuracy of [the attorney's] statement 
with respect to charges by comparable practitioners"); Cunningham 
v. City of McKeesport, 753 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1985) (no 
material issue of fact when affidavit is uncontradicted), vacatedon other 
grounds, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986). 
     Therefore, we vacate and remand to the district court to 
reconsider the appropriate hourly fee for Mr. Epstein's services 
in light of Griffiths, and we affirm the district court's 
reduction of Mr. Rapp's and Ms. Adams's hourly fees. 
 
                      C. The number of hours 
 
     In support of the petition, Mr. Epstein submitted forty 
pages of itemized records specifying the date when the work was 
performed, the attorney performing the work, the nature of the 
work (e.g., "Prepare complaint," "Conference with Alan Epstein 
regarding liability issues"), the amount of time spent and the 
hourly rate charged for that particular task.  JA 90-129. 
     The district court dramatically reduced the hours allowed.  
First, in spite of the documentation submitted by Mr. Epstein, 
the district court found that the hours set forth were "not 
properly documented."  Memorandum, typescript at 5.  As the court 
explained, 
     [i]t would be fair to say that most of the entries are 
     vague and identified only by non-descriptive statements 
     such as "research", "review", "prepare", "letter to", 
     and "conference with."  Descriptions such as this do 
     not suffice in establishing the reasonableness of a fee 
     petition. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
     Second, the court found that "many of the billable hours 
requested are redundant, unnecessary or excessive."  Id.  The 
court gave various examples of what it considered excessive, 
including that "Epstein, an experienced litigator, claims 69.6 
hours for unspecified 'trial preparation', an amount of time 
approximately twice as long as the trial itself."  Id., 
typescript at 6. 
     Third, the court found that "requesting that this Court 
approve an expenditure of over $175,000 in fees to obtain a 
$25,000 verdict is nonsensical."  Id., typescript at 7. 
     On the basis of these concerns, and following the lead of 
Judge Robreno in Oliver, the district court decreased the number 
of hours to be billed by one-half "on the grounds that they are 
excessive and unreasonable."  Id., typescript at 8.  In addition, 
the court decreased the hours by another fifty percent on the 
basis that "Washington hardly won a decisive victory in this 
case."  Id.  The court pointed out that five of Mr. Washington's 
nine claims were dismissed on summary judgment, that he did not 
prevail on "his primary claim," racial discrimination, and that 
the jury had awarded him far less than the $661,756.02 in damages 
and $103,000 in lost wages he initially sought.  Id. 
                          1. Specificity 
     We first review the district court's conclusion that Mr. 
Epstein did not adequately document the hours claimed.  Attorneys 
seeking compensation must document the hours for which payment is 
sought "with sufficient specificity."  Keenan, 983 F.2d at 472.  
More specifically, our jurisprudence has established that "[a] 
fee petition is required to be specific enough to allow the 
district court 'to determine if the hours claimed are 
unreasonable for the work performed.'"  Id. at 473 (citing Rode, 
892 F.2d at 1190 (citation omitted)).  It is an established 
proposition of law that "[w]here the documentation of hours is 
inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly."  
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).  This 
proposition, however, only begs the question of what constitutes 
adequate documentation. 
     In answering this question, we do not operate in a legal 
vacuum.  On several occasions, this Court has considered the 
proper degree of specificity required of a party seeking 
attorneys' fees.  In particular, we recently undertook such a 
review in Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1990).  
We explained that specificity should only be required to the 
extent necessary for the district court "to determine if the 
hours claimed are unreasonable for the work performed."  Id. at 
1190 (citing Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 713 F.2d 972, 978 (3d Cir. 
1983), cert. denied sub nom. International Broth. of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America v. Pawlak, 464 
U.S. 1042 (1984)).  Specifically, 
     a fee petition should include "some fairly definite 
     information as to the hours devoted to various general 
     activities, e.g., pretrial discovery, settlement 
     negotiations, and the hours spent by various classes of 
     attorneys, e.g., senior partners, junior partners, 
     associates."  However, "it is not necessary to know the 
     exact number of minutes spent nor the precise activity 
     to which each hour was devoted nor the specific 
     attainments of each attorney." 
Rode, 892 F.2d at 1190 (citing Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of 
Philadelphia, 487 F.2d at 167).   
     Because we found that the district court had applied too 
exacting a standard in reducing hours for lack of specificity, we 
vacated its determination.  The party seeking counsel fees had 
submitted various documents as evidence of the hours spent on the 
case, including a "computer-generated chronological list of the 
tasks performed and the time devoted to those tasks by the two 
attorneys, the paralegal and the law clerk who worked on the 
case."  Id. at 1189.  The district court found fault with the 
presentation of the records in simple chronological order, but we 
rejected the court's imposition of a requirement that records be 
kept by task -- e.g., for each motion, issue or part of the case.  
Id. at 1189-90.  The district court also found that the list did 
not "provide[] adequate and specific descriptions of services and 
the time devoted to those services."  Id. at 1190.  In fact, 
     [e]ach entry provided the general nature of the 
     activity and the subject matter of the activity where 
     possible, e.g., T (Dusman); CF (client); R (re 
     appeals), the date the activity took place and the 
     amount of time worked on the activity. 
Id. at 1191. 
     We concluded that the submissions in support of the petition 
"provided enough information as to what hours were devoted to 
various activities and by whom for the district court to 
determine if the claimed fees are reasonable."  Rode, 892 F.2d at 
1191.      
     We recently reaffirmed our Rode holding, noting that the 
Court in Rode "found sufficient specificity where the computer- 
generated time sheet provided 'the date the activity took 
place.'"  Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 473 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  In Keenan, we found that "computer-generated 
summaries of time spent by each attorney and paralegal met the 
standards of Rode."  Id. 
     The computerized lists submitted by Mr. Epstein and his 
colleagues clearly meet the standards that we found satisfactory 
in Rode and Keenan.  Therefore, as we did in Rode, we find that 
the district court applied erroneous legal standards when it 
concluded that the hours were not properly documented. 
                            2. Excess 
     We now turn our attention to the district court's conclusion 
that the hours are "excessive and unreasonable."  Memorandum, 
typescript at 8.  The court gave seven separate examples of the 
alleged "outrageousness" of Mr. Epstein's claim, having to do 
with hours claimed for the review of an entry of appearance filed 
by the County Court's counsel, discovery planning, research on a 
motion to compel filed by the Court, review of the Court's motion 
for summary judgment and preparation of the response, trial 
preparation, review of trial tapes, and preparation of post-trial 
motions.  The court found that "[t]hese figures are not merely 
excessive, they border on the outrageous."  Id., typescript at 7. 
     Mr. Epstein challenges the court's conclusions regarding 
these various examples.  In the first instance, the court deemed 
as "redundant, unnecessary or excessive" 5.5 hours for research 
on a motion to compel filed by the County Court.  Memorandum, 
typescript at 6.  The motion was apparently to compel Mr. 
Washington to submit to an examination by a psychologist and, 
according to Mr. Epstein, certainly required the number of hours 
claimed: 
     Plaintiff filed an answer and an eight-page memorandum 
     of law.  The trial court does not explain why 5.5 hours 
     is excessive on this less than ordinary discovery 
     issue.  To the contrary, research and drafting of these 
     papers would likely take a lawyer the 5.5 hours 
     claimed. 
Brief of Appellant at 24. 
     The second example given by the district court to which Mr. 
Epstein objects is time amounting to 158.2 hours spent in 
preparing for and litigating the County Court's motion for 
summary judgment.  Mr. Epstein justifies the number of hours on 
the length of the County Court's motion, the number of issues it 
raised, the voluminous record and the length of his reply 
memorandum.  Id. at 24-25. 
     Third, the court stated that "Epstein, an experienced 
litigator, claims 69.9 hours for unspecified 'trial preparation', 
an amount of time approximately twice as long as the trial itself 
($17,400)."  Memorandum, typescript at 6.  Mr. Epstein argues in 
response that "this ratio is quite reasonable and that 
experienced and successful trial lawyers spend substantially more 
time in preparation than they do in the courtroom."  Brief of 
Appellant at 25. 
     Fourth, the court stated that "Epstein claims 26.1 hours in 
reviewing tapes of the trial for the preparation of post-trial 
motions, an amount of time almost as long as a minute-by-minute 
replay of the entire trial, from voir dire to verdict ($6,525)."  
Memorandum, typescript at 6.  Here again, Mr. Epstein offers a 
detailed explanation for the time:  
     The motion for judgment as a matter of law was based on 
     the argument that there was insufficient evidence to 
     support the jury's verdict.  To properly respond to 
     this motion, plaintiff was obligated to marshall every 
     fact and every piece of evidence that a reasonable jury 
     could have relied upon to reach its verdict.  This in 
     turn required a detailed and exact review of all of the 
     testimony in the case to assemble the relevant evidence 
     that supported the verdict. 
Brief of Appellant at 26. 
     Finally, Mr. Epstein challenges findings by the district 
court regarding "some very minor categories" on the ground that 
"each is reasonable."  Id. at 27. 
     Our task is not to determine whether, sitting as a court of 
first instance, we would have reached the same conclusion as the 
district court did.  Rather, we only review the court's finding 
that the hours claimed by Mr. Epstein are "excessive and 
unreasonable" for clear error.  While Mr. Epstein offers 
persuasive arguments to support the hours he and his colleagues 
spent on the various parts of the trial, we conclude that these 
arguments fall short of satisfying our exacting standard of 
review and therefore conclude that the district court's 
conclusion is not clearly erroneous. 
                        3. Proportionality 
     The district court stated that "[b]y any standard, 
requesting that this Court approve an expenditure of $175,000 in 
fees to obtain a $25,000 verdict is nonsensical."  Memorandum, 
typescript at 7.  Mr. Epstein challenges this statement on the 
ground that the court's position violates Third Circuit law 
against proportionality analysis to determine the reasonableness 
of counsel fees.  Brief of Appellant at 29. 
     It is true that this Court has expressed serious concerns 
with the practice of limiting an award of attorney's fees to 
maintain proportionality between the fees and the amount of 
damages awarded.  See, e.g., Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 
807 F.2d 49, 52-54 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 
(1987); Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 474- 
75 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1068 (1990).  However,  
before considering the legal propriety of the district court 
conducting a proportionality analysis, we must first determine 
the significance of the court's statement.  This statement, 
standing alone, is somewhat ambiguous.  On the one hand, it can 
certainly be read, as Mr. Epstein does, as suggesting that the 
district court was concerned with the ratio between the damages 
awarded Mr. Washington and the fees sought by Mr. Epstein and his 
colleagues, and that it cut down the fees accordingly.  The 
statement could, on the other hand, reflect the court's opinion 
that Mr. Epstein failed to exercise "billing judgment."  SeeHensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) ("The applicant 
should exercise 'billing judgment' with respect to hours 
worked"). 
     There is some support for this alternative reading.  The 
court's statement came directly after its conclusion that the 
figures presented by Mr. Epstein "are not merely excessive, they 
border on the outrageous."  Memorandum at 7.  After making this 
finding, the court went on to explain: 
     If they were actually sent to a client who was expected 
     to pay for them, the bill would possible [sic] result 
     in that client either going bankrupt or, at a minimum, 
     finding a new attorney.  By any standard, requesting 
     that this Court approve an expenditure of over $175,000 
     in fees to obtain a $25,000 verdict is nonsensical." 
Id. 
     The court then cited the court's conclusion in Oliverregarding the 
same issue that "the petition tendered by 
plaintiff's counsel is woefully deficient of the billing judgment 
that should have animated its preparation."  Id. (citing Oliver 
v. Bell, No. CIV. A. 92-751 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1994) (Order 
Memorandum)). 
     Nonetheless, in light of the district court's earlier 
comment, made while discussing the history of the case, that 
"[h]aving won a verdict of $25,000, Washington's attorney . . . 
now asks that attorneys' fees be approved in excess of seven 
times the amount of that award, $175,987.50," Memorandum at 3, we 
find the interpretation suggested by Mr. Epstein persuasive, and 
conclude that the district court did consider proportionality as 
a factor in its analysis.  The two comments taken together seem 
no accident. 
     We now turn to the legal propriety of the court's action.  
Our review of the jurisprudence commences with the edicts of the 
United States Supreme Court on the issue at hand.  The preeminent 
case on the subject is City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 
(1986).  City of Riverside, however, offers no clear direction.  
Based on an analogy with private tort actions, the municipality- 
petitioner in that case had suggested that attorney's fees in 
civil rights lawsuits "should be proportionate to the amount of 
damages a plaintiff recovers."  Id. at 573 (Brennan, J., 
plurality).  Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of four, 
rejected the analogy, noting that 
     [u]nlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights 
     plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and 
     constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in 
     monetary terms. . . .  Regardless of the form of relief 
     he actually obtains, a successful civil rights 
     plaintiff often secures important social benefits that 
     are not reflected in nominal or relatively small 
     damages awards. 
Id. at 574 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
     In other words, the monetary amount awarded to the plaintiff 
would not be an accurate measure of the success achieved by the 
attorneys in the case, and therefore attorney's fees assessed in 
proportion to the damage award would not adequately compensate 
the attorneys for their labor, which the plurality compared to 
that of a "private attorney general."  Id. at 575 (citation 
omitted).  The plurality concluded that "[a] rule of 
proportionality would make it difficult, if not impossible, for 
individuals with meritorious civil rights claims but relatively 
small potential damages to obtain redress from the courts," id.at 578, and 
for this reason rejected such a rule.  
     Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, because he saw no 
basis to reject the district court's detailed findings of fact.  
But the emphasis of his concurrence was markedly different from 
that of the plurality opinion: 
     Where recovery of private damages is the purpose of a 
     civil rights litigation, a district court, in fixing 
     fees, is obligated to give primary consideration to the 
     amount of damages awarded as compared to the amount 
     sought.  In some civil rights cases, however, the court 
     may consider the vindication of constitutional rights 
     in addition to the amount of damages recovered. 
Id. at 585 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).  In a 
footnote that received substantial attention, the Justice added, 
"[i]t probably will be the rare case in which an award of privatedamages 
can be said to benefit the public interest to an extent 
that would justify the disproportionality between damages and 
fees reflected in this case."  Id. at 586 n.3.  Finally, then- 
Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by three other Justices, 
including Chief Justice Burger, who also wrote a separate 
dissent. 
     Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its opinion, this 
Court tackled the difficult task of sorting through City of 
Riverside's muddled outcome in Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 
807 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987) 
[hereinafter Cunningham II].  After noting that "the Supreme 
Court plurality rejected a proportionality rule," id. at 52, we 
considered what import to give to Justice Powell's concurrence: 
          . . . Justice Powell's opinion might be read to 
     suggest that disproportionality justifies a negative 
     multiplier. 
 
          We refrain from inferring such a view from City of 
     Riverside, however.  First, this interpretation 
     represents at most the view of a lone Justice and was 
     not endorsed by any of the other eight. . . .  Second, 
     we have doubts about Justice Powell's statement that 
     only the rare case justifies disproportionate fee 
     awards.  The facts of City of Riverside seem similar to 
     those of a number of  1983 cases that we have seen. . 
     . .  Finally, we consider application of Justice 
     Powell's reasoning problematic.  The opinion sets out 
     no method or standards by which a court might calculate 
     the public interest served by a case, evaluate that 
     interest in light of a disproportionality between 
     damages and fees, and eventually settle upon a 
     particular negative multiplier.  In the absence of an 
     explicit mandate, we are reluctant to begin the 
     difficult task of developing standards by which we 
     might incorporate proportionality principles into the 
     attorney's fee calculus. 
Cunningham II, 807 F.2d at 53-54 (footnote omitted); see alsoNortheast 
Women's Center, 889 F.2d at 474-75 (noting that the 
"Supreme Court in City of Riverside [rejected] the 
proportionality rule in the civil rights context.").   
     For the reasons articulated by the plurality in City of 
Riverside and by this Court in Cunningham II,  we hold today that 
a court may not diminish counsel fees in a section 1983 action to 
maintain some ratio between the fees and the damages awarded.  
This is not to say that the amount of damages is irrelevant to 
the calculation of counsel fees.  To the contrary, we recently 
recognized that "the amount of the compensatory damages award may 
be taken into account when awarding attorneys' fees to a civil 
rights plaintiff."  Abrams v. Lightolier, 50 F.3d 1204, 1222 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  But as the context of our statement in Abrams makes 
clear, the reason why the damage amount is relevant is not 
because of some ratio that the court ought to maintain between 
damages and counsel fees.  Rather, the reason has to do with the 
settled principle, which we discuss hereinafter, that counsel 
fees should only be awarded to the extent that the litigant was 
successful.  The amount of damages awarded, when compared with 
the amount of damages requested, may be one measure of how 
successful the plaintiff was in his or her action, and therefore 
"may be taken into account when awarding attorneys' fees to a 
civil rights plaintiff."  Id. 
     The County Court attempts to refute Mr. Epstein's arguments 
on two grounds.  First, it argues that the district court did notapply a 
"strict proportionality test": "[h]ad the lower court 
followed the strict 'proportionality' rule discussed in Abrams, 
the court would not have awarded fees in excess of the damage 
award."  Brief of Appellee at 23.  By a "strict proportionality 
test," the County Court apparently refers to a rule whereby 
counsel fees cannot exceed the amount of damages awarded.  This 
Court clearly rejected such a test in Abrams, 50 F.3d at 1222 
("there is no rule that the fees award may be no larger than the 
damages award") (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 
(1983)), and it is clear that the district court did not apply 
such a test.  Today we embrace the broader proposition that the 
district court cannot adjust counsel fees to maintain a certain 
ratio between the fees and damages -- to insure, for instance, 
that fees not exceed three times the amount of damages.  That is 
just the type of analysis into which the district court seems to 
have entered. 
     The second argument advanced by the County Court is that 
even if the district court did conduct a proportionality analysis 
(albeit not what it calls a "strict" one), it did so correctly.  
In support of this proposition, the County Court suggests that 
"[u]nder Hensley, the district court is required to consider 'the 
relationship between the extent of success and the amount of the 
fee award.'"  Brief of Appellee at 23 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. 
at 438).  But Hensley does not stand for the proposition that the 
court should adjust counsel fees to reflect a certain ratio 
between fees and damage awards; rather, it stands for the 
proposition, which we discussed in an earlier paragraph, that the 
amount awarded in counsel fees should reflect the extent to which 
the litigant was successful.  See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440 ("A 
reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however 
significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the 
litigation as a whole.") (emphasis added). 
     It is clear that the district court, in the disputed 
statement, concluded that it was "nonsensical" to award fees of 
$175,000 for a judgment of 25,000 because the request was 
disproportionate with what the court considered a more 
appropriate ratio.  (Indeed, the court turned to the "success" 
analysis substantially later in its opinion.)  We hold that the 
court's consideration of the proportionality of the damages to 
the fee award was legal error.  Therefore, as this legal error 
affected the district court's determination to "decrease the 
hours by one-half on the grounds that they are excessive and 
unreasonable," Memorandum at 8, we must remand to the district 
court for it to make only such part of that reduction as was not 
due to proportionality.  Above, we also concluded that we must 
remand this same determination so that any reduction due to 
specificity can also be eradicated. 
                            4. Success 
     Finally, the district court diminished Mr. Epstein's counsel 
fees by another fifty percent on the basis that "Washington 
hardly won a decisive victory in this case."  Memorandum, 
typescript at 8.  As the court explained, 
     Five of Washington's nine claims did not survive a 
     summary judgment motion.  At the time of trial, 
     Washington requested a total of $661,756.02 in damages, 
     a figure which did not include mental anguish, punitive 
     damages, and prejudgment interest, and also did not 
     include the $103,000 Washington claimed in lost wages.  
     The jury ruled against his primary claim, racial 
     discrimination, and awarded him what amounted to a 
     nominal recovery of $25,000 on his retaliation claim. 
Id. 
     In addition, the district court did not apply the reduction 
to the time spent in preparation of the fee petition, but fully 
disallowed time claimed for preparation of a motion to amend the 
judgment to this Court which was denied.  Id., typescript at 9. 
     Mr. Epstein contends that the court's analysis is based on a 
"clear error of law" because "by persuading the jury to find for 
the plaintiff on the racial retaliation claim, plaintiff 
prevailed on a central theory of his case."  Brief of Appellant 
at 30.  Mr. Epstein further argues that the initial claim of 
racial discrimination "was so clearly related to the winning 
claim, that as a matter of law, there can be no reduction of fees 
for the work done since the time was necessarily spent on both 
issues."  Id. at 30-31.  As he explains, 
     [A]ll of the evidence that was produced regarding the 
     race discrimination claim was necessary in the 
     litigation of the retaliation claim.  The retaliation 
     was undertaken to punish plaintiff for his assertion of 
     race discrimination, and to properly show to the jury 
     the nature of the retaliation, the full context, 
     including the alleged race discrimination, had to be 
     proven. 
Id. at 32. 
     Finally, Mr. Epstein argues that "the fact that the jury 
awarded $25,000 is not a proper basis for reducing the hours or 
the lodestar on the theory that the result was not a good one for 
the plaintiff."  Id. 
     We are unconvinced by Mr. Epstein's arguments.  It is well 
established that "the court can reduce the hours claimed by the 
number of hours 'spent litigating claims on which the party did 
not succeed and that were "distinct in all respects from" claims 
on which the party did succeed.'"  Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183 
(quoting Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public 
Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 919 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Hensley, 461 
U.S. at 440)).  Notwithstanding Mr. Epstein's contentions, we 
conclude that the district court did not commit error when it 
reduced Mr. Epstein's fees for his failure to prevail on one of 
his two central claims, that of discrimination.  In addition, the 
alleged relatedness between the two general claims is too tenuous 
to support a finding of error.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
court was well within its broad discretion when it discounted the 
fees by fifty percent for partial lack of success. 
 
                          IV. Conclusion 
 
     In light of the foregoing, we will vacate the district 
court's award of attorneys' fees and remand for further 
consideration consistent with this opinion.  In particular, we 
will vacate the district court's assessment of Mr. Epstein's 
hourly rate, and remand for a new calculation in accordance with 
this opinion; in addition, we will vacate the district court's 
reduction of the number of hours by one half for their being 
"unreasonable and excessive," and direct the court to consider 
anew whether that reduction is warranted in light of our 
decision. 
Washington v. Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, No. 95- 
1613 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, Concurring and Dissenting. 
     Following our seminal attorneys' fees cases in Lindy Bros. 
Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. 
(Lindy I) , 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973), and Lindy Bros. 
Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. 
(Lindy II), 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (in banc), this court 
carefully articulated the standard of review in attorney's fees 
cases: 
     [A]n award of reasonable attorneys' fees is within the 
     district court's discretion.  Thus our standard of 
     review is a narrow one.  We can find an abuse of 
     discretion if no reasonable man would adopt the 
     district court's view.  If reasonable men could differ 
     as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial 
     court, then it cannot be said that the trial court 
     abused its  discretion.  We may also find an abuse of  
     discretion when the trial court uses improper standards 
     or procedures in determining fees, or if it does not 
     properly identify the criteria used for such 
     determination. 
Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1982) (quotations 
and citations omitted); see also Deisler v. McCormack Aggregates 
Co., 54 F.3d 1074, 1087 (3d Cir. 1995).  What divides this panel 
is not the selection of this standard of review as the governing 
legal precept; here, there are no competing precepts.  SeeMajority 
typescript at 6 ("We review the reasonableness of an 
award of attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion.") (citation 
omitted).  In agreement on the controlling major premise, then, 
we differ only as to what it means.  Such interpretation, 
however, implicates questions of both legal philosophy and 
jurisprudence. 
     At bottom, this case is about whether an appellate court 
appreciates the allocation of competence between trial courts and 
reviewing courts.  To be sure, statements of deference by 
appellate courts to district judges appear in this court's 
dispositions.  See, e.g., Majority typescript at 6.  But quoting 
a standard of review and respecting it are different matters.  
See, e.g., Majority typescript at 11-13, 17-25.  We must be 
vigilant of this court's increasing proclivity to deny 
substituting its judgment for that of the district court, but 
then to proceed with the tack that it expressly renounces.  In 
this regard I am reminded of Byron's account of Julia:  "And 
whispering 'I will ne'er consent' -- consented."  Byron, Don 
Juan, Canto I, St. 117 (quoted in R. Aldisert, The Judicial 
Process 717 (2d ed. 1996)). 
 
                                I. 
     I first indicate those portions of the majority's opinion of 
which I am in accord.  I agree that the district court did not 
clearly err in finding that the hours claimed by Mr. Epstein were 
"excessive and unreasonable."  Majority typescript at 17.  I also 
agree "that the district court was well within its broad 
discretion when it discounted the fees by fifty percent for 
partial lack of success." Majority typescript at 27. 
     Further, I agree that in light of the district court's 
reliance on the district court opinion, subsequently reversed by 
Griffiths v. Signa Corp., Nos. 94-2090 and 94-2091 (3d Cir. Nov. 
30, 1995) (unpublished), we should remand for reconsideration of 
the attorney's reasonable hourly rate.  Thus, I concur in the 
remand order. 
     Upon careful examination of the attorneys' time sheets, seeA91-A129, 
I too have trouble with the district court's conclusion 
that "[m]any of the hours set forth in the fee petition are not 
properly documented."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 5.  Indeed, I agree with 
the majority's reading of Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177 
(3d Cir. 1990), which held that billing records such as those at 
issue here need not document "the exact number of minutes spent 
nor the precise activity to which each hour was devoted nor the 
specific attainments of each attorney."  Id. at 1190 (quotation 
and citation omitted); see Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 
F.2d 459, 473 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Majority typescript at 13- 
15.   However, the statement of the district court giving rise to 
this discussion of specificity, reprinted in the margin, 
appears in a single paragraph of a much larger discussion under 
the heading "HOURS REASONABLY EXPENDED".  That section of the 
district court opinion contained an independent alternative 
justification for reducing the number of hours -- "that many of 
the billable hours requested are redundant, unnecessary or 
excessive."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 5.  The majority has no quarrel 
with this alternative basis.  See Majority typescript at 17 
("[W]e only review the court's finding that the hours claimed by 
Mr. Epstein are 'excessive and unreasonable' for clear error.  
While Mr. Epstein offers persuasive arguments to support the 
hours he and his colleagues spent on the various parts of the 
trial, we conclude that these arguments fall short of satisfying 
our exacting standard of review and therefore conclude that the 
district court's conclusion is not clearly erroneous.").  Thus, 
although the majority remand based on the District Court's 
criticism of the specificity of the documentation, in light of 
the alternative justification for reducing the number of hours, I 
dissent from the remand order based on specificity. 
 
                               II. 
     I turn next to the majority's contention that the district 
court "diminish[ed] counsel fees ... to maintain some ratio 
between the fees and damages awarded."  Majority typescript at 
22.  For the reasons that follow, I do not agree that the 
district court impermissibly considered the proportionality of 
the damages in diminishing the requested fee. 
     I turn first to the statement of the district court upon 
which the majority premise their reasoning.  The district court 
stated that "requesting that this Court approve an expenditure of 
$175,000 in fees to obtain a $25,000 verdict is nonsensical."  
Dist. Ct. Op. at 7.   
     To be sure, this court has expressed serious concerns with 
the practice of limiting an award of attorneys' fees to maintain 
proportionality between the fees and the amount of damages 
awarded.  See, e.g., Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 807 F.2d 
49, 53-54 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987); 
Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 474-75 (3d 
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1068 (1990).  Although the 
district court's statements, in and of themselves, have the 
potential of being interpreted as implying that the district 
court improperly reduced the fees to maintain proportionality, we 
must consider the context in which the district court made them. 
     The district court offered the "nonsensical" description 
after concluding that the fees submitted by Appellant "are not 
merely excessive, they border on the outrageous."  Dist. Ct. Op. 
at 7.  The district court explained that: 
     If the[se figures] were actually sent to a client who 
     was expected to pay for them, the bill would possibl[y] 
     result in that client obviously going bankrupt or, at a 
     minimum, finding a new attorney. 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 7.  Accordingly, taken in context, the district 
court's statement also reflects a determination that Appellant 
failed to exercise "billing judgment."  See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) ("The applicant should exercise 'billing 
judgment' with respect to the hours worked.").  Indeed, after 
making these statements, the district court added that "the 
petition tendered by plaintiff's counsel is woefully deficient of 
the billing judgment that should have animated its preparation."  
Dist. Ct. Op. at 7 (citing Oliver v. Bell, No. CIV. A. 92-751 
(E.D. Pa. June 30, 1994) (Order Memorandum)). 
     The majority agree that alternate inferences can be drawn 
from the ambiguous statement of the district court.  See Majority 
typescript at 18 ("The statement could, on the other hand, 
reflect the court's opinion that Mr. Epstein failed to exercise 
'billing judgment.'  There is some support for this alternative 
reading...").  Yet, given two reasonable interpretations of an 
ambiguous statement, the majority reject one reasonable 
interpretation, in favor of another reasonable interpretation.  
This a reviewing court may not do.  Indeed, "[i]f reasonable 
people could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by 
the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court 
abused its discretion."  Deisler, 54 F.3d at 1087 (quotation and 
citation omitted). 
     Moreover, even using the majority's preferred reasonable 
interpretation of the district court's statement, the majority do 
not identify how the district court deployed the forbidden ratio.  
And indeed, even after the reductions, the fee awarded by the 
district court still exceeded the damages by a ratio of 1.216 to 
1 ($30,389.63 to $25,000.00).  This hardly bespeaks a rigid 
mathematical calculation by the district court. 
     Furthermore, the majority construct an unworkable -- if not 
implausible -- schemata for determining attorneys' fees.  They 
condemn any relationship between fees and recovery, while making 
it clear that the relationship between fees and recovery remains 
extremely relevant in considering the plaintiff's success.  SeeMajority 
typescript at 23; see also Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 168 ("In 
evaluating the quality of an attorney's work in a case, the 
district court should consider ... the amount of recovery 
obtained.").  Although the majority purport to announce a new 
rule of law that forbids consideration of proportionality between 
the damage award and attorneys' fees, the currency value of this 
initial public offering is seriously discounted by recognizing 
that at least three clear exceptions inhere in it:  one, in 
measuring success, see Abrams v. Lightolier, 50 F.3d 1204 (3d 
Cir. 1995); Majority typescript at 22; two, when considering 
billing judgment, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); and 
three, as recounted above, in evaluating the quality of an 
attorney's work. 
     Thus, the majority's new offspring is born with at least 
three bar sinisters on its escutcheon, and staggering through its 
uneasy fledgling steps, will no doubt cause confusion within 
district courts and, most assuredly, will generate litigation.  
Especially troubling here is that the majority fail even to 
disclose where or how the district court employed a 
proportionality ratio.  To borrow from Lord Devlin, "I confess 
that I approach the investigation of this legal proposition with 
a prejudice in favour of the idea that there may be a flaw in the 
argument somewhere."  St. John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank, 1 
Q.B. 267, 282 (1957).  Accordingly, I dissent in all respects 
from the majority's conclusion on proportionality. 
 
                               III. 
     I do not come as a stranger to attorney fee jurisprudence in 
this court.  Twenty years ago, I authored the in banc opinion in 
Lindy II, wherein I stated the views of our court at that time: 
     We find it necessary also to observe that we did not 
     and do not intend that a district court, in setting an 
     attorneys' fee, become enmeshed in a meticulous 
     analysis of every detailed facet of the professional 
     representation.  It was not and is not our intention 
     that the inquiry into the adequacy of the fee assume 
     massive proportions, perhaps even dwarfing the case in 
     chief.  Once the district court determines the 
     reasonable hourly rates to be applied, for example, it 
     need not conduct a minute evaluation of each phase or 
     category of counsel's work. 
Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 116. 
     Whatever had been the intention of the full court in 1976, 
the history of the past decades demonstrates that our district 
judges today have "become enmeshed in a meticulous analysis of 
every detailed facet of the professional representation," as 
evidenced by the opinions in this case.  So also this court has 
become enmeshed.  Perhaps the time has arrived for us to have 
the full court revisit basic concepts of our attorneys' fees 
jurisprudence in order to furnish clearer guidance, and 
hopefully, minimize the atrocious fulmination of these cases, 
here and in the district court. 
     Drawing from my personal experience of almost 30 years on 
this court, and my current practice of sitting in three or four 
circuits each year, I beg indulgence to permit a personal 
expression of what troubles me in examining pertinent cases.  
Appellate courts seem to have lost respect for the narrow review 
encompassed in reviewing an exercise of discretion.  Either 
because they have a hunger to get involved in the action, or 
because they disagree viscerally with fees set by the district 
courts, appellate judges introduce a devious device to broaden 
appellate review: new standards or criteria for district courts 
to follow meticulously. 
     What has emerged is what Holmes called "Delusive exactness 
[,] a source of fallacy throughout the law."  In this practice, 
newly created "standards and criteria" wag the tail of genuine 
exercise of discretion.  And to argue against this, as I do, is 
to inveigh against Mom and Apple pie because everybody knows that 
"standards and criteria" are good for you.  As indeed they are in 
most circumstances, but not if they destroy the exercise of 
discretion.  These standards and criteria create an environment 
where an appeal is taken every time a district judge fails to 
kiss the book or to genuflect properly. 
     Most importantly, appeals challenging deviations from these 
standards and criteria arrive in the appellate court with a 
fundamental difference: the standard of review is not a limited 
review of exercise of discretion or the more restricted clear 
error, but plenary.  See Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 
459, 472 (3d Cir. 1992) (the question of what standards to apply 
in calculating an award of attorney's fees is a legal question 
subject to plenary review).  Thus, instead of playing a limited 
role in the determination of attorneys' fees in limited review of 
discretion, the appellate courts, like the proverbial camel, have 
not only stuck their noses under the district courts' tent, but 
they are fully inside ranging around in turf that properly 
belongs to the district courts. 
     Almost 40 years ago a youthful Charles Alan Wright, 
America's premier federal courts expert, now president of the 
American Law Institute, wrote a very perceptive law review 
article entitled The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts 
in which he decried the development in "which trial courts [are] 
losing most of their power [and] the appellate courts have drawn 
unto themselves practically all the power of the judicial 
system."  Professor Wright noted: 
     The principal consequences of broadening appellate 
     review are two.  Such a course impairs the confidence 
     of litigants and the public in the decisions of the 
     trial courts, and it multiplies the number of 
     appeals.... Every time a trial judge is reversed, every 
     time the belief is reiterated that appellate courts are 
     better qualified than trial judges to decide what 
     justice requires, the confidence of litigants and the 
     public in the trial courts will be further impaired.  
     Under any feasible or conceivable system, our trial 
     courts must always have the last word in the great bulk 
     of cases.  I doubt whether there will be much 
     satisfaction with the judgments of trial courts among a 
     public which is educated to believe that only appellate 
     judges are trustworthy ministers of justice. 
     I associate fully with Professor Wright's observations and 
find his commentary apropos and germane to current attorneys' 
fees jurisprudence.  I believe that we should return to the basic 
concepts of discretionary review we set forth in Lindy II: "If 
reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action 
taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial 
court abused its discretion," 540 F.2d at 115, and cease the 
manufacturing of "standards and procedures" in order to bring 
about an abuse of discretion as a matter of law because the 
district courts failed, directly or indirectly, to cross every 
"t" and dot every "i" to the satisfaction of an appellate judge.  
We should free the district courts in attorneys fees cases from 
the solemn high mass ritual as is now required in the reception 
of guilty plea under Criminal Rule 11, or the judiciary's nit 
picking version of the USGA rules of golf---Sentencing 
Guidelines.  As Professor Wright comments, "If trial judges are 
carefully selected, as in the federal system, it is hard to think 
of any reason why they are more likely to make errors of judgment 
than are appellate judges." 
     Indeed, there are several reasons why district judges are 
much more capable of exercising broad discretion.  They are on 
the scene.  They smell the smoke of battle.  Indeed, Professor 
Maurice Rosenberg has identified four reasons that support 
vesting discretion in trial courts.  The first three are lesser 
reasons: 
      
    One is the plain urge to economize on judicial 
          energies. Appeal courts would be swamped to the 
          point of capsizing if every ruling by a trial 
          judge could be presented for appellate review.  
          * * * 
 
      
    A second reason is maintaining morale.  A trial 
          judge ... would have an oppressive sense that 
          appellate Big Brothers [and Sisters] were ever 
          watching, peering over the trial bench, waiting 
          for the harried and hurried trial judge to lapse 
          into mortal fallibility. 
 
      
    The third reason is ... finality.  The more 
          reverse-proof the trial judge's rulings, the less 
          likely the losing party is to test them on appeal 
          and the sooner the first adjudication becomes 
          accepted and the dispute tranquilized. 
Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed 
From Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 660-61 (1971).  Then follows 
what he calls the most pointed and helpful reason: 
      
    [T]he superiority of his [or her] nether position. 
          It is not that he [or she] knows more than his [or 
          her] loftier [brothers and sisters]; rather [the 
          trial judge] sees more and senses more.  In the 
          dialogue between the appellate judges and the 
          trial judge, the former often seem to be saying: 
          "You were there.  We do not think we would have 
          done what you did, but we were not present and we 
          may be unaware of significant matters, for the 
          record does not adequately convey to us all that 
          went on at the trial. Therefore, we defer to you." 
Id. at 663.  So long as the jurisprudence has conferred 
discretionary power in the district courts, we should respect it.  
We should not construct obstacles to its use in the form of 
artificial standards and criteria, the breach of which we deem an 
abuse of discretion as a matter of law, thereby creating a 
philosophical oxymoron by savaging traditional notions of 
discretionary powers. 
     It is for the foregoing reasons that I dissent from the 
majority approach, except in those areas set forth above, in 
which I concur.      
 
 
 
